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Nietzschean Genealogy and Hegelian History
in The Genealogy of Morals

Philip J. Kain
Santa Clara University
Santa Clara, CA 95053
USA

I would like to o er an interpretation of the Genealogy of Morals, of the relationship
of master morality to slave morality, and of Nietzsche's philosophy of history that is
di erent from the interpretation that is normally o ered by Nietzsche scholars. Contrary
to Nehamas, Deleuze, Danto, and many others, I wish to argue that Nietzsche does not
1
simply embrace master morality and spurn slave morality. I also wish to reject the view,
considered simply obvious by most scholars, that the Übermensch develops out of, or on
2
the model of, the master, not the slave. And to make the case for all of this, I want to
explore the relationship between Hegel's master-slave dialectic and the con ict Nietzsche
sees between master morality and slave morality. That Nietzsche does not intend us to
recall the famous master-slave dialectic of Hegel's Phenomenology as we read the
Genealogy of Morals, I nd di cult to believe. Yet very few commentators ever notice,
let alone explore, this connection. Those who do, like Deleuze, Greene, and Houlgate,
think that Nietzsche, in direct opposition to Hegel, simply sides with the master, not the
slave, and that Nietzschean genealogy renounces all Hegelian dialectic--or any sort of
1

A. Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press 1985), 206. G. Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, H. Tomlinson, trans. (New
York: Columbia University Press 1983), 10. A.C. Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher
(New York: Macmillan 1965), 158-160, 166. Also see O. Schutte, Beyond Nihilism:
Nietzsche without Masks (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1984), 108. On the
other hand, Kaufmann does not think that Nietzsche necessarily identi es with the
master; W. Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press 1968), 3rd edition, 297.
2
Schacht is an exception here; he does not think that the Übermensch simply
grows out of master morality; R. Schacht, Nietzsche (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
1983), 466.

3

Hegelian developmental view of history. I do not think any of these views are correct. I
wish to argue that Nietzsche is very much in uenced by Hegel and that Nietzschean
genealogy and Hegelian history are intimately linked in the Genealogy of Morals. Thus I
think that there is a limit that must be put to the recent tendency, otherwise most
insightful and illuminating, to see Nietzsche as radically postmodern, as totally breaking
with the 19th century, and, certainly, as having little to do with Hegel.
I
In the rst essay of the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche holds (in direct contradiction to
most other modern theorists) that morality originally had nothing to do with what
bene ted others, with what was non-egoistic or non-sel sh, or even with what was useful
to others. It did not even describe what was done to others, but simply who did it, the
character of the doer--the good ones themselves. 'Good' originally meant noble,
aristocratic, powerful, true, the truthful ones. We are the good ones! It was a concept
inextricably connected with class--the upper and superior class, the good people--their
estimation and a rmation of themselves. Master morality was a triumphant a rmation
4
of self.
And 'bad' meant the opposite--the low, the plebeian, the base. This concept, too, was
established by the aristocrats, not the slaves. It was established by those who 'seized the
right to create values … [t]he lordly right of giving names … they say "this is this and
5
this," … and, as it were, take possession of it.… ' The bad were the others, the ones not
like us good ones. Etymologically, Nietzsche claims, the word 'good' in all languages
originally meant noble, aristocratic, great, excellent; and 'bad' meant base, common,
6
plebeian.
3

Deleuze, 10, 156, 195. Also M. Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,' in
Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, D.F. Bouchard, ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press 1977), 151-4. M. Greene, 'Hegel's "Unhappy Consciousness" and
Nietzsche's "Slave Morality,"' in D.E. Christensen, ed., Hegel and the Philosophy of
Religion (The Hague: Martinus Nijho 1970), 125-41. S. Houlgate, Hegel, Nietzsche
and the criticism of metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986), 19-20.
However, Schacht thinks that Nietzsche holds a revised view of Hegelian development;
Schacht, 395. For a good review of the literature on the relationship of Hegel to
Nietzsche, though for the most part dealing with issues other than those that I will treat,
see D. Breazeale, 'The Hegel-Nietzsche Problem,' in Nietzsche-Studien, M. Montinari,
W. Müller-Lauter, H. Wenzel, eds. (Berlin: de Gruyter 1975), IV, 146-58.
4
Whenever available, I have used Kaufmann's translations of Nietzsche and, for
the German, Nietzsche Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, G. Colli and M. Montinari,
eds. (Berlin: de Gruyter 1967 .). I will, whenever possible, cite both the section and
the page of Nietzsche's text so that any other editions, English or German, may be used.
On the Genealogy of Morals (hereafter GM ), in On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce
Homo, W. Kaufmann, ed. (New York: Vintage 1969), 'First Essay,' § 2, pp. 25-6; § 5, p.
29; § 10, p. 36.
5
GM, 'First Essay,' § 2, p. 26.
6
GM, 'First Essay,' § 4, pp. 27-8.

Slave morality is the very opposite of master morality. It is not self-a rming. Slaves
do not rst look to themselves and say we are good. Slave morality is reactive. It rst
looks to the other--the nasty, vicious, brutal masters. And it says they are evil. It is lled
with ressentiment. Only secondly does it look to itself and a rm weakness, humility,
subservience, not strength and power. This is the morality of priests, slaves, subordinates.
7

Nietzsche thinks we nd master morality in Homer, in Rome, in the Renaissance, and
for a last brief moment in Napoleon before this morality disappears in the modern world.
It has been defeated by slave morality. We nd slave morality among the Jews, in
Christianity, in the Reformation, in the French Revolution, in democracy, and in
8
socialism--all of which are committed to the weak, the poor, and the powerless.
It is nearly impossible, it seems to me, to read the rst essay of the Genealogy of
Morals without recalling the master-slave dialectic of Hegel's Phenomenology. There
we met two desiring consciousnesses, each seeking the con rmation of their own
self-conscious reality through the recognition--to the point of total submission--of the
other. These two engage in a life and death struggle. One of them wins and becomes the
master. The other loses and is made a slave. The rst seems to become a powerful,
independent, autonomous consciousness, who now imposes his will upon the other and
satis es his desires--he puts the slave to work for him and enjoys life in a way that he
could not before. The slave, on the other hand, becomes a dependent consciousness, one
who works and serves--a mere thing whose very reality is de ned by the master and for
9
the master.
But then there occurs the profound reversal that makes the master-slave dialectic so
classic. The master, we begin to see, is not really independent. He is quite dependent.
He depends upon the slave not only for work and the satisfaction of his desires, but for
10
recognition as well. What kind of self-con rmation can be gained from the recognition
of a slave--a nobody, an object, a thing? On the other hand, for his part, the slave,
through fear and work begins to overcome his thing-like dependence. Daily fear for his
life before the master forces the slave to become self-referent, self-conscious, aware of his
own self-importance, and to do so in a way that deepens and interiorizes the slave far
more than occurs for the master. And through work the slave transcends his dependence
and develops the power to accomplish something of value. Work requires that desire be
delayed and disciplined in order to develop the ability to control nature and to create an
11
object that can meaningfully satisfy human needs and desires.
Thus, the demands of the master, which begin as an external and repressive force, are
internalized by the slave; they become a discipline which deepens and spiritualizes the
slave; they push him to work and allow him to create something of signi cance. This
7

GM, 'First Essay,' § 10, pp. 36-7.
GM, 'First Essay,' § 16, pp. 53-4.
9
Phenomenology of Spirit, A.V. Miller, trans. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1977),
114-16; for the German see Phänomenologie des Geistes, J. Ho meister, ed. (Hamburg:
Felix Meiner 1952), 144-6.
10
Phenomenology, 116-7 and Phänomenologie, 147-8.
11
Phenomenology, 118-9 and Phänomenologie, 148-50.
8

very same model can be found at all levels of Hegel's thought, and ultimately it explains
the construction of our whole reality. Kojève has argued that all change, progress, and
12
development occur on the part of the slave, not the master. At any rate, we must see
that historical development, for Hegel, very much follows the model of the slave. In the
Philosophy of History, Hegel writes: 'The two iron rods which were the instruments of
this discipline were the Church and serfdom. The Church drove the "Heart" to
desperation--made Spirit pass through the severest bondage.… In the same way serfdom,
which made a man's body not his own, but the property of another, dragged humanity
through all the barbarism of slavery.… It was not so much from slavery as through
slavery that humanity was emancipated.… it is from this intemperate and ungovernable
13
state of volition that the discipline in question emancipated him.'
In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel puts it in more general terms: 'Mind attains its
actuality only by creating a dualism within itself, by submitting itself to physical needs
and the chain of these external necessities, and so imposing on itself this barrier and this
nitude, and nally by maturing (bildet ) itself inwardly even when under this barrier
14
until it overcomes it and attains its objective reality in the nite.' History is a process
that involves external repression, which is accepted as a discipline, which is internalized
and sublimated, which produces greater spiritual depth, and which allows one to create by
transforming the world and oneself. In the Phenomenology, for Hegel, consciousness,
which begins simply as a desiring consciousness, quickly becomes an ascetic,
self-denying consciousness, and in the sphere of religion, at the stage which Hegel calls
'Unhappy Consciousness,' projects from itself, imaginatively creates, all reality, though it
15
takes this reality to be an other, a beyond, an ideal, not itself or its own doing.
At any rate, while Hegel and Nietzsche agree that slaves in fact have won out over
masters, nevertheless, Nietzsche seems to reject with contempt the Hegelian slave and
Hegelian history, certainly as having anything to do with the emergence of the
Übermensch. Instead, Nietzsche seems to side with the master and with genealogy as
opposed to history.
For Nietzsche, the past is understood as the result of a meaning, a direction, an
interpretation imposed upon things by those with the power to do so--by those with the
'lordly right of giving names … they say "this is this and this," they seal every thing and
16
event with a sound and, as it were, take possession of it.' Whatever exists:

12

A. Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, A. Bloom, ed. (New York:
Basic Books 1966), 22, 51.
13
Philosophy of History, J. Sibree, ed. (New York: Dover 1956), 407 and, for the
German, see Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, G. Lasson, ed.
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner 1968), II-IV, 875.
14
Philosophy of Right, T.M. Knox, trans. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1952), 125
and, for the German, see Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, J. Ho meister, ed.
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner 1955), 168.
15
Phenomenology, 138 and Phänomenologie, 170-1. Also Greene, 137.
16
GM, 'First Essay,' § 2, p. 26.

is again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and
redirected by some power superior to it; all events in the organic world are a
subduing, a becoming master, and all subduing and becoming master involves a
fresh interpretation, an adaptation through which any previous 'meaning' and
'purpose' are necessarily obscured or even obliterated.… purposes and utilities are
only signs that a will to power has become master of something less powerful and
imposed upon it the character of a function; and the entire history of a 'thing,' an
organ, a custom can in this way be a continuous sign-chain of ever new
interpretations and adaptations whose causes do not even have to be related to one
17
another …
The best example of this can be found in the second essay of the Genealogy of Morals
where Nietzsche explores the meaning of punishment. He says, 'the concept
"punishment" possesses in fact not one meaning but a whole synthesis of "meanings":
the previous history of punishment in general, the history of its employment for the most
various purposes, nally crystalizes into a kind of unity that is hard to disentangle, hard to
analyze … Today it is impossible to say for certain why people are really punished: all
18
concepts in which an entire process is semiotically concentrated elude de nition … '
The meaning of punishment is variable, accidental, plural. It has meant many very
di erent things: rendering harmless, preventing further harm, recompense, inspiring fear,
repayment, expulsion, preserving purity, a festival to mock a defeated enemy, and many
19
other things. As Deleuze puts it, the history of anything is the succession of forces
which take possession of it or struggle for its possession. The same thing changes sense
depending upon the forces that appropriate it. There is thus always a plurality of senses
20
to anything.
It would seem to be clear from this that history, for Nietzsche, cannot be going
anywhere; it certainly cannot be progressing or developing in a Hegelian sense. There is
no goal to history, nor even any goals within history. There is certainly no 'logic' to
history, nor necessity. There is not even a single, coherent ' ow' of history. It is a random
series of seizures by di erent forces. Looking back on it, we who study it can dig up a
series of layers, geological strata, or, perhaps better, we nd a palimpsest, one text written
over another. There is as much logic, connection, development, goal-directedness, or
necessity between di erent stages of history as there is between di erent layers of text in
a palimpsest.
For this reason we need genealogy rather than Hegelian history. Genealogy, as
Shapiro puts it, has to do 'with the ascertaining of actual family lineages to determine
21
rights to titles, honors, and inheritances … ' These lineages are not at all necessarily the
17

GM, 'Second Essay,' § 12, p. 77.
GM, 'Second Essay,' § 13, p. 80.
19
GM, 'Second Essay,' § 13, pp. 80-1.
20
Deleuze, 3-4.
21
G. Shapiro, 'Translating, Repeating, Naming: Foucault, Derrida, and the
Genealogy of Morals, ' in C. Koelb, ed., Nietzsche as Postmodernist (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press 1990), 39.
18

result of steady Hegelian growth like the interest in a bank account, but could well be the
result of ruthless con icts, reversals, accidents, victories, seizures. Where Hegelian
history builds to, culminates in, and reinforces the present, genealogy, much more so than
Hegelian history, has a powerful tendency to undermine the present. It can show us that
things were radically di erent in the past, that despite our present condition our ancestors
were great and grand and noble--or it may show us that they were small, ugly, and
embarrassing.
History is not, it would seem, a slave-like development, a discipline, a deepening, a
working toward some end. In the Use and Abuse of History, Nietzsche ridicules Hegel's
notion that we have reached our zenith through world history, a view 'which turns
practically every moment into a sheer gaping at success, into an idolatry of the actual … '
22
Nietzsche rejects this conservative aspect of Hegel's thought. Nietzsche wants to
radically subvert the present. He uses genealogy to undermine the actual and hopefully to
go beyond it. For Nietzsche we must look selectively to the past in order to create the
23
future. But we can understand the past only 'by what is most powerful in the present.'
Only by straining our noblest qualities to their highest power can we nd what is greatest
in the past. It would seem that it would take a master, an Übermensch, to interpret the
past, to grasp its greatest meaning--otherwise you draw it down to your own level. And
what this master grasps then must be coined into something never heard before and used
24
to create a new cultural vision--to impose and construct a future. This is not the slave
who su ers and labors. This is the master who names and imposes--who seizes,
reinterprets, and projects a new vision. It would seem that Nietzsche rejects the slave and
Hegelian history. It would seem that Nietzsche embraces the master and genealogy. And
it would seem that the Übermensch is connected with the latter, not the former. It would
seem so. That is the reading of almost all the commentators. Nevertheless, it is not,
nally, Nietzsche's view. Or so I wish to argue in what follows.
II
Even in the rst essay, if we look for them, there are passages that disturb the easy and
seemingly obvious assumption that Nietzsche simply approves of the masters and not the
slaves or priests. He says that only with the priestly form of existence did 'man rst
become an interesting animal, that only here did the human soul in a higher sense
acquire depth and become evil-- and these are the two basic respects in which man has
25
hitherto been superior to the other beasts!' He says that 'history would be altogether too
26
stupid a thing without the spirit that the impotent have introduced into it … ' It is
Nietzsche's view, I think, that the masters really are not very bright, 'When the noble
22

The Use and Abuse of History (hereafter UAH ), A. Collins, trans. (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill 1949), § VIII, pp. 51-2. See also Beyond Good and Evil (hereafter BGE ),
W. Kaufmann, trans. (New York: Vintage 1966), § 207, p. 128.
23
UAH, § VI, p. 40.
24
Ibid.
25
GM, 'First Essay,' § 6, p. 33. Also The Will to Power (hereafter WP ), W.
Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, trans. (New York: Vintage, 1968), § 864, p. 460.
26
GM, 'First Essay,' § 7, p. 33.

mode of valuation blunders and sins against reality, it does so in respect to the sphere
with which it is not su ciently familiar, against a real knowledge of which it has indeed
in exibly guarded itself: in some circumstances it misunderstands the sphere it despises,
27
that of the common man, of the lower orders … ' At any rate, it is quite clear that
priests are much more intelligent than the masters, 'A race of such men of ressentiment is
28
bound to become eventually cleverer than any noble race … ' This is hardly a attering
picture of the masters and it is far from a negative picture of the priests. The masters are
quite stupid. They are beasts not just in the sense of wild and vicious beasts but in the
sense of ignorant beasts. With masters alone, without priests, humans would not even
have risen above the animals. What can we have been doing when we thought that
Nietzsche simply loved the masters and was repelled by the priests? This is just not his
view, '"The masters" have been disposed of; the morality of the common man has won.
One may conceive of this victory as at the same time a blood-poisoning … The progress
of this poison through the entire body of mankind seems irresistible … To this end, does
the church today still have any necessary role to play? … Which of us would be a free
spirit if the church did not exist? It is the church, and not its poison, that repels us.-29
Apart from the church, we, too, love the poison.--"' Such passages, even if they do not
yet convince us, should unsettle us, should make us very uneasy about the normal
interpretation of Nietzsche.
In the second essay, Nietzsche continues his genealogy of morals, and the rst
question he takes up is how an individual with the ability to make promises--how
responsibility--originally developed. This raises a problem for Nietzsche because he
believes that we all have a natural tendency to forgetfulness. It is absolutely essential to
30
forget if we are to have any peace, and thus be able to act. If we remembered
everything, all the in nite detail we are constantly bombarded with, we would be
overwhelmed; we would, as he puts it in the Use and Abuse of History, lose ourselves in
31
the 'stream of becoming.' Thus, if we are to breed an individual with responsibility, we
must breed an ability to overcome forgetfulness and to keep promises. How was this
done? For Nietzsche, it required brutal torture and cruel punishment. A memory had to
be burned into the individual: 'Man could never do without blood, torture, and sacri ces
when he felt the need to create a memory for himself; the most dreadful sacri ces and
pledges (sacri ces of the rst-born among them), the most repulsive mutilations
(castration, for example), the cruelest rites of all the religious cults (and all religions are
at the deepest level systems of cruelties)--all this has its origin in the instinct that realized
32
that pain is the most powerful aid to mnemonics.'
The important question that we must ask here is who this memory had to be burned
into? One's immediate impression after reading the rst essay and from some of the
language at the beginning of the second essay, including the passage just cited, is that
27
28
29
30
31
32

GM, 'First Essay,' § 10, p. 37.
GM, 'First Essay,' § 10, p. 38.
GM, 'First Essay,' § 9, p. 36.
GM, 'Second Essay,' § 1, pp. 57-8.
UAH, § I, p. 6, see also pp. 5-8.
GM, 'Second Essay,' § 3, p. 61.

memory had to be burned into the slave, certainly not the master. This also seems to be
33
the view of Deleuze and Danto. The notion of being subject to punishment and torture
does not t well with our image of a powerful, independent, and autonomous master. It
would seem rather slave-like. But this is because we have been led astray in our
understanding of Nietzsche's conception of masters and slaves. It is most certainly
Nietzsche's view that memory, responsibility, truthfulness had to be burned into the
masters. In describing the sovereign individual, Nietzsche clearly has the masters in
mind,
This precisely is the long story of how responsibility originated. The task of
breeding an animal with the right to make promises … presupposes … that one
rst makes men to a certain degree … uniform … and consequently calculable
… [T]he labor performed by man upon himself during the greater part of the
existence of the human race, his entire prehistoric labor, nds in this its meaning
… If we place ourselves at the end of this tremendous process … then we
discover that the ripest fruit is the sovereign individual … the man who has his
own independent, protracted will and the right to make promises-- and in him a
proud consciousness, quivering in every muscle, of what has at length been
achieved and become esh in him, a consciousness of his own power and freedom
… This emancipated individual, with the actual right to make promises, this
master of a free will, this sovereign man--how should he not be aware of his
superiority over all those who lack the right to make promises and stand as their
own guarantors, of how much trust, how much fear, how much reverence he
arouses--he 'deserves' all three--and of how this mastery over himself also
necessarily gives him mastery over circumstances, over nature, and over all more
34
short-willed and unreliable creatures?
The masters of the rst essay are clearly examples of sovereign individuals. The
35
masters were the truthful ones, as opposed to 'the lying common man'. It is, then,
especially the masters that must have a memory burned into them--more so than the
slaves.
What we must see here is that the second essay does not just continue on historically
from the point reached at the end of the rst essay. It does not just continue on discussing
the historical development of masters and slaves. Rather, the second essay digs deeper
genealogically; it goes back in time before the issues discussed in the rst essay. It goes
back before masters existed and tries to explain the origin of masters. And perhaps like
all genealogy which undermines, the second essay begins to undermine our rst
impression of the master, the impression that we had at the end of the rst essay. At any

33

Deleuze, 114-15. A.C. Danto, 'Some Remarks on The Genealogy of Morals, ' in
R.C. Solomon and K.H. Higgins, eds., Reading Nietzsche (New York: Oxford University
Press 1988), 17, 26.
34
GM, 'Second Essay,' § 2, pp. 58-60.
35
GM, 'First Essay,' § 5, p. 29. Also BGE, § 260, p. 205.

rate, these masters must have a memory burned into them through a discipline that is very
much like that of Hegel's slave.
Moreover, if we begin to look for it, we can nd other evidence, even in the rst essay,
that the society of the masters is one that involves repression, discipline, and coercion,
the same men who are held so sternly in check inter pares by custom, respect,
usage, gratitude, and even more by mutual suspicion and jealousy, and who on the
other hand in their relations with one another show themselves so resourceful in
consideration, self-control, delicacy, loyalty, pride, and friendship--once they go
outside, where the strange, the stranger is found, they are not much better than
uncaged beasts of prey. They savor a freedom from all social constraints, they
compensate themselves in the wilderness for the tension engendered by protracted
con nement and enclosure within the peace of society, they go back to the
innocent conscience of the beast of prey, as triumphant monsters who perhaps
emerge from a disgusting procession of murder, arson, rape, and torture,
exhilarated and undisturbed of soul, as if it were no more than a students' prank …
36

We tend to remember the ugly brutality of the last part of this passage rather than the
emphasis on constraint, repression, and self-discipline of the rst part. A good example
of the masters would be the ancient Spartans, vicious to their enemies, but whose life at
home was one of barracks-room discipline, a discipline far more rigorous and di cult
even than the discipline they imposed upon their slaves. At any rate, the masters, as much
as, or more than, the slaves, must develop the ability to keep promises, and for this to
occur they must go through a discipline of torture and punishment.
Even further, there is no way to avoid seeing, once we start to look for it, that for
Nietzsche this slave-like discipline produces spiritual depth, sublimation, creativity, and
indeed that for Nietzsche this is the way that we must ultimately come to understand
power. In the rst essay, power often seemed to mean the ordinary power of the
master--military power, political power. In the second essay that is a very secondary type
of power. It is there. A memory is burned into us through punishment and torture. It is
even Nietzsche's view that the state closes in on us and makes us direct our cruelty inward
37
against ourselves. But what we must see--the important point here--is that this external
repression causes us to develop a power within ourselves. It brings about an
internalization, a discipline, an empowering-- and this is the form of power that Nietzsche
is after. This is what power primarily and ultimately means for him. We begin to notice a
shift in this direction when he tells us that what is most interesting about civil laws is not
that they impose the will, say, of a ruler or master, but that they 'constitute a partial
restriction of the will of life' which serves 'as a means of creating greater units of power.'
38
Repression, very much in Hegelian fashion, produces a discipline, an overcoming, the
development of greater power. Nietzsche nowhere sounds more like Hegel than in the
36
37
38

GM, 'First Essay,' § 11, p. 40.
GM, 'Second Essay,' § 16, pp. 84-5.
GM, 'Second Essay,' § 11, p. 76.

following passage from Beyond Good and Evil: 'The discipline of su ering, of great
su ering--do you not know that only this discipline has created all enhancements of man
so far? That tension of the soul in unhappiness which cultivates its strength, its shudders
face to face with great ruin, its inventiveness and courage in enduring, persevering,
interpreting, and exploiting su ering, and whatever has been granted to it of profundity,
secret, mask, spirit, cunning, greatness--was it not granted to it through su ering, through
39
the discipline of great su ering?'
The power Nietzsche is after has little to do with the repression of others. It has much
more to do with accepting repression oneself, turning it into a discipline that can produce
sublimation and self-overcoming, 'This self-overcoming of justice: one knows the
beautiful name it has given itself--mercy; it goes without saying that mercy remains the
40
privilege of the most powerful man, or better, his--beyond the law.' Moreover, this sort
of power, it becomes clearer and clearer the further we proceed in the Genealogy of
Morals, has little to do with the master of the rst essay. By the time we reach the
beginning of the third essay it has become quite evident that the main contenders for the
sort of power that Nietzsche is after are the poet, the priest, and the philosopher.
Nietzsche even says that 'a Homer would not have created an Achilles nor a Goethe a
41
Faust if Homer had been an Achilles or Goethe a Faust.' It is not Achilles--a perfect
example of the master of the rst essay--that Nietzsche is after. He is after Homer--blind,
crippled Homer. Homer's accomplishment is far greater than Achilles'. The best
example of the sort of power Nietzsche is after, the best example of the Übermensch, I
want to argue, is King Vishvamitra,
As men of frightful ages, they did this by using frightful means: cruelty toward
themselves, inventive self-castigation--this was the principal means these
power-hungry hermits and innovators of ideas required to overcome the gods and
tradition in themselves, so as to be able to believe in their own innovations. I
recall the famous story of King Vishvamitra, who through millennia of self-torture
acquired such a feeling of power and self-con dence that he endeavored to build a
new heaven-- the uncanny symbol of the most ancient and most recent experience
of philosophers on earth: whoever has at some time built a 'new heaven' has
42
found the power to do so only in his own hell.
Vishvamitra is a poet, a priest, a philosopher who creates a new heaven, that is, a new
religion, a new vision, new meaning and values. Why this is so important will have to be
discussed at greater length below. At this point, we must notice that King Vishvamitra is
not the master of the rst essay. He is much more like Hegel's slave who develops
internally, who deepens, who becomes more spiritual, who does so through discipline,
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torture, su ering, and who goes beyond the master, the old order, by creating something
new, a new religion, a new cultural vision.
But actually this is not quite accurate. King Vishvamitra is most interesting not
because he represents just the slave principle, but because he represents a linking of the
slave principle with the master principle, and thus of history with genealogy.
Self-discipline, self-torture, going through one's own hell is necessary to build up
power. And power is understood as the power to create a new vision. Just as for Hegel,
the slave does not confront the master militarily or politically. The slave deepens,
sublimates, overcomes by overthrowing the old gods and building a new heaven. The
slave undermines old values and creates new ones. All quite slave-like, certainly, but
nevertheless we must also see that there is much of the master here also--or rather than
the actual master of the rst essay, we must see that what we have is a master-principle
that applies more generally (even in our world, even in the future). Vishvamitra imposes
a new vision, revalues things radically, names them di erently. This Übermensch says
43
'this is this and this,' and 'take[s] possession of it.' This imposition, this creation of a
new reality, clearly requires a master-like power. To impose a new heaven you must have
the power to do so--the power of an Übermensch. And at the point where this new vision
is expressed there occurs a historical break. The new values imposed will be radically
di erent from the old--conceptually and substantially di erent. The new meaning created
will not evolve out of the old in Hegelian fashion. The Übermensch imposes a radically
new and di erent creative vision. It short-circuits historical development. We get a new
paradigm. A revaluation of all values. A new Weltanschauung. A new force takes
possession of things and wrenches their meaning in a new direction.
At the same time, though, the power to set in motion this genealogical break was built
up on the Hegelian slave model. It grew out of the slave morality of the Jewish and
Christian herd. And so, for Nietzsche, I think we must say that whole stretches of history
operate on the Hegelian developmental model of discipline, interiorization, and
sublimation. This build-up can even last for centuries before an Übermensch comes
along with the power to build a new heaven. In fact, it would seem that in large part the
whole Jewish and Christian era up to the present, and perhaps also a good part of the
tradition back to Socrates and Homer--in other words, most of Hegel's Philosophy of
History-- can be accepted roughly as it stands, except that, for Nietzsche, it is not headed
for the Absolute, but rather empowers a Vishvamitra--or a Nietzsche--who will nally
reject it all and create a new worldview. Foucault is wrong, then, when he says that
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Nietzsche rejects ideal continuity and teleological movement. It is true that history as a
whole is not continuous and teleological. Übermenschen introduce breaks into it. But
long segments are continuous and teleological. And they are necessary to lead up to, and
make possible, the Übermenschen who introduce these breaks.
If we now glance back at the rst essay, I think we can begin to see how far we have
come from the normal interpretation of the Genealogy of Morals. If we look back at the
slaves, the herd, the Jews of the rst essay, one of the questions we want to ask is how
they di er from Vishvamitra--how they di er from the Übermensch? And don't we have
43
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to admit that there is a great deal of resemblance between the Jews and Vishvamitra?
Don't we have to admit that it is most di cult to nd any di erence? Don't they both
overthrow the old gods and build a new heaven? Don't they both revalue all values? 'It
was the Jews who … dared to invert the aristocratic value-equation (good = noble =
powerful = beautiful = happy = beloved of God) … saying "the wretched alone are the
good; the poor, impotent, lowly alone are the good; the su ering, deprived, sick, ugly
alone are pious, alone are blessed by God, blessedness is for them alone--and you, the
powerful and noble, are on the contrary the evil … " In connection with the tremendous
and immeasurably fateful initiative provided by the Jews … there begins the slave revolt
45
in morality: that revolt which … we no longer see because it--has been victorious.'
How does this di er from Vishvamitra? I think we must just admit that both slaves
and Übermenschen undergo discipline and torture, which deepens them, makes them
more spiritual, which allows them to overthrow old values, and which allows them to
create a new heaven. One might object that the slaves are reactive, and that this is an
important di erence. But it seems to me that Vishvamitra reacts also. He reacts against
the old gods and tradition--it takes him a millennia of self-torture in his own hell to build
46
up the power to overthrow this old order. It is not easy to nd a meaningful di erence
here.
What de nes the Übermensch for Nietzsche, the test of the Übermensch, is the ability
to embrace eternal recurrence and amor fati. I have discussed these notions in detail
47
elsewhere. Here let me just say that Nietzsche's notion of eternal recurrence implies
that we will have to live through our life over and over again an in nite number of times,
'and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and
sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in
48
the same succession and sequence … ' Most people, Nietzsche thinks, would be
crushed by such a notion. It would sap any life of every shred of meaning, value, or
interest to have to repeat it over and over again. But that is not the view of the
Übermensch. Übermenschen love their lives, every single detail of them. They would
49
change nothing. Whether eternal recurrence and amor fati are to be understood as
50
doctrinal truths or rather as myths, illusions, lies, is not very important. The important
thing is that the ability to accept eternal recurrence and amor fati implies an absolute
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a rmation of life, of life as it is, of one's own life as an intrinsic and ultimate value. The
Übermensch nds meaning in life which is not given to it from outside, from some
higher purpose or end which life must serve and be subordinate to. To accept eternal
recurrence and to love one's fate, to love one's own life, implies enormous power and an
enormous self-con dence in that power. It implies an ability, I suggest, to give your own
life whatever meaning it is to have, to create for yourself your own meaning, and to nd
that acceptable, enough, the highest ful llment. I think that the ability of the Übermensch
to accept eternal recurrence and amor fati is tied to the ability of the Übermensch to
create a new heaven.
We must notice that before he creates his new heaven Vishvamitra could not embrace
amor fati. At that point, he would not want all things the same, unchanged down to
every little detail. That would rule out the great creative act he has been disciplining
himself for millennia to accomplish. Only after he creates a new heaven, or at least after
he knows he will be able to do so, could he be willing to embrace amor fati. It is also
true that embracing amor fati, loving every detail of your life, would rule out
ressentiment. One cannot a rm every moment of one's life and still feel ressentiment.
But overthrowing the old gods and tradition would seem to require ressentiment, or at
least reaction, or at least desire for radical change. It is only after this great creative act
that one can overcome the need for change, reaction, or ressentiment and embrace amor
fati. So also, before this creative act, Nietzsche could not embrace the master model of
history. Before your creation, you still want to overcome, overthrow, change. You want
the slave model of history. You want discipline, interiorization, sublimation. You want to
build up the power to overcome the old gods and create your new vision. Then, and only
then, could you embrace the master model of history.
Both the Übermensch and the slave undergo millennia of self-torture. The di erence
between them is that the Übermensch uses this to build up the power to create a new
heaven, whereas Jewish and Christian slaves, who created their heaven a long time ago,
do not want a new heaven and so undergo their self-torture, accept it, and remain under
it. Moreover, for the priest or the slave, while su ering is necessary, salvation will mean
the end of su ering. The priest or the slave, at least the Christian priest or slave, might
not wish to change anything in their life--because it culminates in salvation. But to have
to go through that life over again, let alone over again an in nite number of times, would
be horrifying. For Nietzsche's Übermensch, the new heaven is not an escape from the
su ering of this world. You just see the same world di erently. You interpret it
di erently. You create a new meaning so that you accept the world fully. You love it. It
is heaven. After all we must remember that Nietzsche, the man who dreamed up eternal
recurrence and amor fati, himself led a life of intense misery and su ering--daily nausea
and incapacitating migraine headaches. Amor fati embraces this, would have it no other
way, loves every detail. Nietzsche was a slave to his illness. He could do nothing about
it. Except that he was able to break its psychological stranglehold. He was able to turn
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an '"it was" into a "thus I willed it."' He could not eliminate his illness, but he could
eliminate its power over him by embracing it, willing it, deciding he wanted it no other
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way. He could turn it into a discipline, so that he could sublimate, so that he could create
new meaning. That is the di erence between a slave and an Übermensch. At the same
time here, we see the deep link between the slave and the Übermensch-- the way the
latter develops out of the former.
III
To understand the Genealogy of Morals further, we must discuss the origin of guilt, the
development of the ascetic ideal, and Nietzsche's all important notion of punishment.
Punishment alone, Nietzsche thinks, will not produce guilt. In fact, punishment tends to
52
harden the criminal and actually hinder the development of guilt. In Nietzsche's view,
guilt arises as society develops, becomes peaceful, closes in, encages the individual, and
prevents the outward discharge of instincts: 'All instincts that do not discharge
themselves outwardly turn inward-- this is what I call the internalization of man: thus it
was that man rst developed what was later called his "soul".… Hostility, cruelty, joy in
persecuting, in attacking, in change, in destruction--all this turned against the possessors
53
of such instincts … ' And once guilt, or bad conscience, develops, priests are quick to
pick up on it, interpret it as punishment for sin, develop it, and push it further as an
54
ascetic ideal, 'the creature imprisoned in the "state" so as to be tamed, who invented the
bad conscience in order to hurt himself after the more natural vent for this desire to hurt
had been blocked--this man of the bad conscience has seized upon the presupposition of
religion so as to drive his self-torture to its most gruesome pitch of severity and rigor.
55
Guilt before God: this thought becomes an instrument of torture to him.'
The state rst arises, Nietzsche holds, as beasts of prey conquer a weaker population.
These masters 'do not know what guilt, responsibility, or consideration are, these born
organizers … It is not in them that the "bad conscience" developed, that goes without
56
saying--but it would not have developed without them … ' Again, we have a Hegelian
master-slave model. Much as for Hegel, the repression instituted by the masters forces
the slaves to internalize, to deepen, and to develop guilt. And for Nietzsche, '"bad
conscience"--you will have guessed it--as the womb of all ideal and imaginative
phenomena, also brought to light an abundance of strange new beauty and a rmation,
57
and perhaps beauty itself.' It is out of this guilt and the ascetic ideal that develops from
it that a Vishvamitra, an Übermensch, will gain the creative power to overcome, to
sublimate, and to create a new heaven. The intensi cation of guilt in the Christian ascetic
ideal is a form of self-discipline and self-torture that takes an especially internalized,
spiritualized form and thus especially contributes to imagination and creativity. It is also,
in Nietzsche's view, the cruelest and most intense form of self-torture and thus may either
be totally crippling or the greatest test, the greatest obstacle to be overcome, and thus
capable of generating the greatest power--the power of an Übermensch.
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It is di cult to decide what Nietzsche means when he says that the masters produce
guilt and responsibility in those they conquer but that they themselves do not know what
guilt and responsibility are. It may be that since Nietzsche is discussing an extremely
early period--the very origin of the state--the masters simply have not yet developed guilt
or responsibility. The second essay, after all, is trying to explain how anyone rst
develops these qualities. Perhaps the masters will develop their feelings of guilt at a
somewhat later period. We have already seen that the masters do develop responsibility.
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They, especially, are the truthful ones, as opposed to the 'lying common man.' Perhaps
it is the case that masters only become responsible, but never develop guilt. Or perhaps
they do develop guilt, but not as intensely as priests or slaves. If they never do develop
guilt, or to the extent that they do not, then I think we must say that the Übermensch and
the master simply would have no connection with one another--the Übermensch would
not develop out of the master at all. This is so because it is Nietzsche's view, I think, that
the Übermensch is not likely to be able to create a new heaven without passing through
the intense, creative discipline of guilt and the ascetic ideal. Thus if one tries to keep the
master and the slave neatly separate, as the normal interpretation would have it, by
claiming that the master does not feel guilt, then the master would not give rise to the
Übermensch. The master would repress the slave and get the process of internalization
started, but, just as for Hegel, all important development would take place on the side of
the slave and the master would simply be a dead end. If one instead decides to admit that
the master does develop guilt and does undergo the ascetic ideal, then one must also
admit that there is a de nite slave-like side to the master, a side that we nd to be deeper
and more signi cant the more we continue to probe these issues. Whichever way we look
at it, we must admit that the Hegelian slave model gures very centrally in the realization
of the Übermensch.
We must now attend much more carefully to punishment. Punishment is very much a
key to Nietzsche's thought. It is punishment which burns a memory into individuals and
makes them responsible, and it is punishment within the closed state which forces the
internalization that becomes guilt and the ascetic ideal. Punishment is most central. And
on Nietzsche's theory there must be a great deal of punishment taking place--it would
seem to play a central role in the development of all morality. It is Nietzsche's view that
in early history people take a great joy in in icting punishment on others. This is more
than just a convenient assumption on his part to explain the likelihood of su cient
punishment. It gets us to the strangest and most interesting dimension of Nietzsche's
thought: 'Today, when su ering is always brought forward as the principal argument
against existence, as the worst question mark, one does well to recall the ages in which
the opposite opinion prevailed because men were unwilling to refrain from making su er
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and saw in it an enchantment of the rst order, a genuine seduction to life.' The
question we must ask is why the in iction of su ering was so enjoyable--such a seduction
to life?
I think Nietzsche's answer is that we live in a terrible and alien cosmos, a cosmos that
does not care about human beings, where all we can expect is to su er. In the Birth of
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Tragedy, Nietzsche recounts the wisdom of Silenus, who when chased down by King
Midas and asked what is best for human beings, answered, 'What is best of all is utterly
beyond your reach: not to be born, not to be, to be nothing. But the second best for you
60
is--to die soon.' Why? Because the possibility of happiness is the sheerest of illusions.
Because human beings live in a miserable world where they are going to su er. There is
no way to avoid this. But, still, this is not precisely the problem. Human beings can live
with su ering. What they cannot live with is meaningless su ering--su ering for no
61
reason at all. Their problem is a problem of meaning. We live in an empty and
meaningless cosmos, and we cannot face that. We cannot look into reality without being
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overcome. We need lies; we must veil the horror of existence.
We must invent
meaning. We must give su ering a meaning. So what do we do? The Greeks invented
gods for whom wars and other forms of su ering were festival plays for their enjoyment.
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Christians invent a God for whom su ering is punishment for sin.
Apart from the ascetic ideal, man, the human animal, had no meaning so
far.…This is precisely what the ascetic ideal means: that something was lacking,
that man was surrounded by a fearful void-- he did not know how to justify, to
account for, to a rm himself; he su ered from the problem of his meaning. He
also su ered otherwise … but his problem was not su ering itself, but that there
was no answer to the crying question, 'why do I su er?'
Man, the bravest of animals and the one most accustomed to su ering, does
not repudiate su ering as such; he desires it, he even seeks it out, provided he is
shown a meaning for it, a purpose of su ering. The meaninglessness of
su ering, not su ering itself, was the curse that lay over mankind so far--and the
ascetic ideal o ered man meaning! It was the only meaning o ered so far; any
64
meaning is better than none at all …
And so also, I suggest, when individuals punish others, su ering is no longer
meaningless--it participates in the larger myth that has been created. It is given meaning.
That is why people of past ages found it so enjoyable to in ict su ering, not just because
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they were sadists, as Danto would seem to think, but because in in icting su ering on
someone else you unconsciously participate in the maintenance of a myth. You keep
meaningless su ering, the terror of existence, at bay. Unconsciously you give
meaningless su ering a meaning. It is true that thereby su ering in the world is
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increased somewhat, but that, Nietzsche seems to be suggesting, is worth it as the price of
removing meaningless su ering through participatory rituals in which you administer
su ering yourself so as to invest it with the meaning it must have for you.
What we must begin to see here is that the question of power, for Nietzsche, is
connected with the problem of meaning. The only kind of power Nietzsche is after, the
sort of power the Übermensch must have, is the power to create meaning--a new heaven,
a new vision, new cultural values. We live in an empty, meaningless void and need the
power to invent meaning in order to be able to live. Nietzsche seeks someone, as he puts
66
it, who will redeem us from nihilism --from meaninglessness. This sort of power has
nothing at all to do with the master of the rst essay who was a military or political
gure. We need a Homer, not an Achilles. We need an artist, a philosopher, or a priest.
We need a Vishvamitra. And the sort of self-discipline this individual must go through,
we are coming to see more and more clearly, is spiritual interiorization, sublimation, an
ascetic self-denial that results in the imaginative expression of a new vision, the invention
of a new meaning to mask the void. The ascetic ideal, Nietzsche thinks, is the
67
precondition for this higher spirituality: 'This secret self-ravishment, this artists' cruelty,
this delight in imposing a form upon oneself as a hard, recalcitrant, su ering material and
in burning a will, a critique, a contradiction, a contempt, a No into it, this uncanny,
dreadfully joyous labor of a soul voluntarily at odds with itself that makes itself su er out
of joy in making su er--eventually this entire active "bad conscience"--you will have
guessed it--as the womb of all ideal and imaginative phenomena, also brought to light an
68
abundance of strange new beauty and a rmation, and perhaps beauty itself … '
The ascetic ideal, then, does three things, two of which we have already discussed at
length. First, the ascetic ideal creates meaning in our world, which otherwise would be a
meaningless void. It thus banishes senseless, meaningless su ering. It interprets
su ering as punishment by God for sin. Secondly, the ascetic ideal disciplines those who
live under it, builds power in them, which may make it possible for a Vishvamitra to
create a new heaven. This is the Hegelian slave model of discipline, interiorization,
spiritualization, and sublimation which can make possible the master model of imposing
new meaning. So far, the ascetic ideal, far from being a denial of life, as it may seem to
69
some, is a powerful a rmation of life.
Thirdly, and this is something we have not discussed at all yet, the ascetic ideal,
because it contains and has always contained a powerful will to truth, begins, in the
modern era, to destroy the meaning and the power it has created over the millennia; it
begins to rip aside the veil and to plunge us into the void--into nihilism. The ascetic
ideal, Nietzsche thinks, has a rigid and unconditional faith 'in a metaphysical value, the
70
absolute value of truth … ' The ascetic ideal denies itself, certainly denies itself all
falsehood, illusion, lies. Moreover, in Nietzsche's view, science is the latest and noblest
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form of the ascetic ideal, and certainly modern science has a powerful will to truth.
This drive to get at the truth is a problem. It is a problem because reality is terrible.
Truth is horrible. We live in an empty and meaningless cosmos where we can only expect
to su er. We cannot live without myths and illusions. We have always needed an
Übermensch, someone powerful enough to impose these myths. And now the will to
truth characteristic of the ascetic ideal is ripping aside the veil, leading us to the last thing
we want--true reality. We are about to fall into the abyss--plunge into nihilism. We will
perish if that occurs. We need a Vishvamitra, an Übermensch, to create a new heaven.
Even the Übermensch needs such illusion. No more than anyone else can the
Übermensch live in the void.
Thus, the ascetic ideal, for a couple of millennia, has given us meaning in a
meaningless cosmos. It is now undermining that meaning through its will to truth. But it
also disciplines us, builds power in us, that may make it possible to create a new heaven.
IV
At this point, it has to be clear to us that masters and slaves are not two neat and separate
classes. The master of the rst essay is not someone Nietzsche does anything so simple
as just identify with. He plays with the concept of the master--experiments with it. He
uses it to dislodge and reveal. He uses it to undermine the morality of the present. He
shows us the genealogy of this morality--which embarrassingly leads us back to the
opposite of what presently exists. When Nietzsche succeeds in relaxing our grip on the
morality of the present, the master is tossed aside, and the master-principle begins to
shift, evolve, and become much more subtle:
master morality and slave morality-- I add immediately that in all the higher and
more mixed cultures there also appear attempts at mediation between these two
moralities, and yet more often the interpenetration and mutual misunderstanding
of both, and at times they occur directly alongside each other--even in the same
72
human being, within a single soul.
consider how regularly and universally the ascetic priest appears in almost every
age; he belongs to no one race; he prospers everywhere; he emerges from every
class of society.…--it must indeed be in the interest of life itself that such a
73
self-contradictory type does not die out.
Here we have di erent tendencies, di erent attitudes within the same person--not
di erent classes of people. Furthermore, back in the rst essay, if we now read even more
carefully than before, Nietzsche makes it quite clear that priests--while they are the
opposite of the masters and are aligned with the slaves--nevertheless, are themselves
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aristocrats, nobles, masters. And Nietzsche speaks of 'how easily the priestly mode of
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valuation can branch o from the knightly-aristocratic and then develop into its opposite;
this is particularly likely when the priestly caste and the warrior caste are in jealous
75
opposition … ' Priests and masters are two parts of the same class. Priests are masters.
Even Zarathustra tells us that his blood is related to that of priests 'and I want to know
76
that my blood is honored even in theirs."'
If we admit that the priest is a type of master, then the next step is to notice that for
77
Nietzsche the 'Jews … were the priestly nation … par excellence … ' It follows, then,
that Jews are a type of master. And there is good reason to think that Nietzsche accepts
this view. In the Jews, he says, 'there dwelt an unequalled popular-moral genius: one
only has to compare similarly gifted nations--the Chinese or the Germans, for
78
instance--with the Jews, to sense which is of the rst and which of the fth rank.'
Clearly the Germans are of the fth, and the Jews of the rst, rank. In Beyond Good and
Evil, Nietzsche says: 'The Jews, however, are beyond any doubt the strongest, toughest,
and purest race now living in Europe; they know how to prevail even under the worst
conditions (even better than under favorable conditions) … That the Jews, if they wanted
it--or if they were forced into it, which seems to be what the anti-Semites want--could
even now have preponderance, indeed quite literally mastery over Europe, that is certain;
79
that they are not working and planning for that is equally certain.' What we must
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10). At least, Nietzsche is not anti-Semitic in the ordinary sense--he does not hate Jews,
think them inferior, etc. But Nietzsche is often guilty of what might be called positive
racism. He is all too willing to generalize about races or nations, to assign them a
character, a uni ed identity, perhaps even an essence. In doing so, he often points to what
he takes to be the strengths of a people. But to ignore variation between individuals, to
rank a people against other peoples, to lump them together and to generalize in this way,
only di ers from ordinary racism in that it approves of this people rather than disapproves
and demeans.
Schutte has suggested that Nietzsche scholars tend to cover up for Nietzsche--they
tend to avoid criticizing many of his values. She argues that we ought to be much more
critical of him. I agree with this. I think many of Nietzsche's views, especially those
centering around his elitism, are morally atrocious. But I think our criticism must be
carefully timed. We must restrain our criticism until we understand Nietzsche. Schutte
goes on to say that 'Nietzsche repeatedly justi ed slavery and the exploitation of the
disadvantaged for the sake of the development of a "higher culture … "' (Schutte, 162).
This, I have tried to argue in this paper, is to misunderstand and to oversimplify the
relation of master to slave as Nietzsche understands it. The Übermensch is as much a
slave as a master and the role of the slave in producing a higher culture is much more
subtle and complex than Schutte's complaint suggests.

nally accept is that 'master' and 'slave' refer to qualities, characteristics, tendencies that
can be found in any society, class, or person.
So instead of asking whether Nietzsche endorses or approves of the master or the
slave, we should ask which model of history Nietzsche uses, that of the Hegelian slave or
that of the master and genealogy? Which will explain the possibility of the Übermensch?
Which will explain the possibility of Europe's move to and beyond nihilism? As I have
tried to argue in this paper, it is de nitely not simply the master model that can be used to
do these things. It requires a complex mix of both models.

